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Jon Twichell/Associates 70 Hermosa Avenue Oakland, CA 94618 Phone: (415) 861-8336 (510) 652-9309 fax: (510) 652-9310 e-mail: ltwichel@pacbell.net May 10, 2000 Mr. Wesley Hough,
Co-President Mr.
Steve Peyser, Co-President Public Resources
Advisory Group Public Resources Advisory Group 3550 Wilshire
Boulevard, Suite 1630 40 Rector Street, Suite 1600 Los Angeles, CA 90010 New York, NY
10006 Dear Mr. Hough &
Mr. Peyser: We have reviewed the set of April
2000, documents submitted to the State of Nevada by the monorail
proponents. Unfortunately, these
documents did not include the Wilbur Smith Associates (WSA) or PRAG reports,
nor did they indicate any change in the monorail's unsupportable claims that their
3.8-mile system could be completely self-supporting. The April 2000 documents consist
most notably of a recent budget indicating startup fares have been increased to
$2.50 one-way, a fourth draft of the URS Greiner "forecasts"
understating, as before, the elasticity implications of an even higher fare,
and another draft of the bond underwriter's efforts. We note that Salomon Smith Barney has now doubled its fees to
over $12 million. We also note that the
purchase price of the existing monorail has risen from $20 million to $25
million and the reimbursement for predevelopment expenses from $9 million to
$12 million. There is no explanation
for these increases, and there continues to be no breakdown of these costs. In addition, there has been a 226 percent
increase in the LLC management and oversight fee, from $88.3 million to $287.9
million, over the life of the project (to 2035). We are aware of the political
pressures being applied to approve this project, no matter the consequences,
and also of the many millions in profits the various monorail participants
anticipate. The purpose of this letter
is to review the six questions you asked of Wilbur Smith Associates in December
1999 and to contribute our comments, based on this recent document submittal.
The Wilbur Smith Associates letter of May 8, 2000 does not directly address
these six questions. It
remains evident that the proposed monorail, if ever constructed, will become
insolvent as soon as it is opened and its reserve funds quickly depleted. Wendell Cox now projects that the higher
initial fares will worsen financial results by at least $4 million annually,
beginning in 2004. Based on this new
data, he predicts reserves will be consumed in 2007. When
looking at issues of substance in relation to this proposed project, it also
remains clear that the proponents are presenting projections, assumptions,
forecasts, models, unsubstantiated claims, and chatter about the "unique
nature of Las Vegas." There is absolutely
no evidence, based on fact, which
would convince a reasonable person that the proposed monorail has the
capability to return the billion dollar plus revenues essential to pay for
itself. The Wilbur Smith letter, while proffering phrases such as "
appears to be reasonable, " and "appears logical," is careful to
point out on page 4, that "WSA is unable to comment on the reasonableness
of the resulting forecasts in the absence of control counts to validate the
global demand." There is no track record of
income for the current monorail, which is proposed to be extended. This is a free, no-fare service. All short-haul monorails in Las Vegas are
free; parking for both patrons and employees at Las Vegas casinos is free;
connector bus service at convention facilities is free. A survey in November 1999, of over 5, 000
patrons of the free Mandalay Bay monorail indicated that 84 percent were
unwilling to pay for any monorail trip in Las Vegas. Self-promotion to sell privately
funded transportation projects has not had a successful track record. The billion dollar San Jaoquin toll road in
California, promoted by many of the participants of the proposed monorail
project, has experienced usage 56 percent below projections. Short tourist trips on the proposed monorail
may be even more price sensitive and the monorail is apt to experience even
lower actual usage. Furthermore,
despite the extravagant monorail claims of $6 million to $8 million in initial
advertising revenues on their system, the fact is that there are zero
advertising revenues on the current monorail system. A visit to the MGM monorail station, for instance, indicates no
advertising whatsoever, unless you include a lone TV set promoting future
events at the MGM Grand. Second,
there are no case studies supporting the supposedly lucrative returns for
monorail as public transit. A Bombardier-constructed monorail system in
Jacksonville, Florida is an embarrassing financial failure, costing hundreds of
millions of dollars and capturing only one-tenth of its projected ridership. A 40-year old short-haul tourist monorail in
Settle covers its operating costs, but only attracts 8,500 riders a day. The lack of monorail use nationally is
indicative of its shortcomings as a public transit technology. Finally,
the history of public transit finance in the United States over the past 50+
years clearly indicates that the proposed monorail will never realize the
revenues they are claiming. Public transit economics is clear-cut. The national average for farebox return is
about 42 percent of operating and maintenance costs, with advertising and other
income contributing another 4 percent.
The remaining 54 percent of operating costs and 100 percent of capital
purchase and debt service costs, are covered by public tax monies. Las Vegas is no different; the CAT transit
system had a 42.5 percent rate of return in 1998, and their advertising
revenues were 4 percent of total revenues and a bit under 2 percent of total
operating expenses. The
notion that a 3.8 mile, seven station, off-strip monorail will magically
generate enough revenue to cover operating costs, maintenance expenses, bond
principal reduction and massive debt payments is just not credible. We
next address, point by point, the questions posed to WSA in December 1999. "Is the methodology employed by URS Greiner
appropriate? No. The URS Greiner
forecasts appear to be constructed as means to justify an end, rather than an
unbiased examination of the ridership issue.
While draft #4 removes some of the more extreme of their assertions,
such as positing a direct positive relationship between hotel rooms and the
present monorail… despite stagnant ridership on the current system…their
forecasts still rest on projections based on the perception of free fares,
rather than the currently-proposed $2.50 fare. The
URS Greiner forecasts rest on the assumption that most monorail riders will
perceive their fares to be zero and thus understate the sensitivity of monorail
ridership to fare. There is a long
history at APTA and elsewhere of clear-cut elasticities that can be applied to
transit fares. Yet, a key flaw in the
URS work is their refusal to apply fare elasticity and willingness to pay
factors to all riders who will actually pay... since such application would
render the monorail infeasible. Bernard
Malamud, Professor of Economics at the University of Nevada Las Vegas and an
independent consultant, properly applied the willingness to pay coefficients
developed in the Stated Preference Survey to the proposed monorail, and arrived
at a most likely daily ridership of 25,810.
Professor Malamud has carefully assessed recent changes and alternative
fare assumptions. He now predicts daily
ridership of 26,000 to 29,000 and annual ridership of 8.7 million to10.6
million at a $2.50 fare based on an alternative fare structure (figure
enclosed). The Wendell Cox Consultancy reviewed the RTC model, and came to the
conclusion that 26,600 daily passengers was a high ridership projection. Jon Twichell/Associates contrasted the
practical example of the San Francisco Cable Car, and concluded that 25,000 was
an optimistic estimate of proposed monorail daily ridership. Jon
Twichell/Associates has pointed out another substantial fault in the URS
Greiner forecasts. When it became
obvious costs were rising and fare revenues could not be further inflated, URS
Greiner accepted uncritically the LLC's claims of $6 to $8 million in
advertising revenues annually. These
claims, initially based on one unsubstantiated letter, are now based on three
unsubstantiated letters. The proposed
monorail will be very fortunate to obtain one million dollars in advertising
revenues annually, which is an amount equal to the annual advertising revenues
for the entire RTC Greater Las Vegas transit system. Representations
are being made that McCarrran Airport has high advertising revenues, therefore
the monorail will as well. This ignores
the fact that the proposed monorail is not a new airport, but an expanded
public transit system which currently has zero advertising revenues. Transit advertising is based on impressions,
the number of times at eye level that motorists and pedestrians see bus
advertising. The monorail is out of
just about everyone's sight lines. Another
assertion is that the "naming rights" of the monorail have some
monetary value, ala sports stadiums.
This ignores the fact that whenever an event occurs at the Staples
Center, Enron Field or Pacific Bell Park these facilities are named and seen by
millions of television viewers regionally and nationally. No one will see the monorail on the news,
except when it declares bankruptcy or another calamity occurs. Thomas A. Rubin thoroughly discussed the
weaknesses of the advertising revenue assertions in his and Jon Twichell/Associates'
report of February 23, 2000. "Are each of the assumptions of the report valid and
appropriate?" No. Another one of the
more obvious errors in the URS Greiner forecasts is the "adjustment"
of the RTC model based on the Stated Preference Survey. It is clear, we believe that the SPS is
applicable only to those hotels which would be directly served by the
monorail (more on this under the next section) and cannot be extrapolated to
the entire Strip. The
experience of the currently free monorail confirms this. As pointed out in the URS Greiner report on
page 23, initial daily ridership on the existing system plateaued at 14,200 for
several years, then fell off 10 percent, to 12,800 a day in 1998. In 1999, it
rose slightly to 13,400 and only since the Paris casino opened has ridership picked
up. The
reason for stagnant ridership, despite no fares, is obvious; the vast majority
of patrons are those at the two hotels served by the monorail, Bally's and MGM
Grand. Despite the recent additions of
the Bellagio, the Venetian and Mandalay Bay to the Strip, there were no
additional stops on the monorail, hence no significant pickup in
ridership. Only now that Paris has
opened has a new, adjacent attraction stimulated ridership. Those
hotels immediately adjacent to the proposed monorail stops contain about 24,000
rooms. This portion, about one-fifth of
the rooms in the resort corridor, will contribute patrons to the system; the
other four-fifths will not. Again, it
is obvious the ridership of the proposed system will in actuality be significantly
lower than proponent's inflated claims.
It should also be noted that currently a couple and their two children
can stay at Bally's and visit the MGM Grand at no cost. If the proposed monorail extension were to
be implemented, it would cost $20 for the same short roundtrip for this
group. Common sense dictates that fare
will impact monorail ridership. "Was the size and composition of the Stated Preference
Survey sufficient?" No. The SPS is
representative of those properties immediately served by the monorail, but not
fully applicable to the overall Strip.
Fifty percent of the respondents were patrons of Bally's, MGM or the
Flamingo Hilton, while well over 80 percent of the respondents were directly
related to projected monorail stops.
Again, the results of this survey were biased towards properties
immediately adjacent to proposed monorail stations. As such, the pool of 24,000 hotel rooms and those zones
immediately adjacent to the monorail stops could be said to be adequately
represented. However, extrapolating the
results of the SPS to the overall Strip is inappropriate. Comparing
the SPS results with ongoing research contained in "Las Vegas
Perspective" reinforces the bias we perceive in the SPS; percentages of
respondents flying vs. driving, as well as other key information, varies
significantly between the SPS and annual figures generated in
"Perspectives." "Are the fare elasticity coefficients provided by the
Stated Preference Survey handled properly in the projections?" Clearly Not. Professor
Bernard Malamud completed his initial review of the URS Greiner methodology in
November of 1999, and concluded that the most likely case at that time was for
daily 25, 810. URS Greiner assumes most
passengers on the proposed monorail will perceive their rides to be free, and
therefore they do not apply the fare elasticity coefficients provided by the
Stated Preference Study to those passengers.
The assumption of zero perceived fare may be reasonable for the 26
percent of Las Vegas visitors who stay at hotels directly adjacent to the
monorail, but it is not for the other 74 percent of visitors who will not stay
at monorail hotels. When Professor
Malamud applies the SPS willingness to pay coefficients to rides by the 74
percent of visitors who will not be staying at monorail hotels and to Las Vegas
residents, his projections are for 29,000 daily rides at $2.50 fare, as opposed
to the URS Greiner projections of over 50,000 paid passengers daily when the
system opens in 2003. "Is it appropriate for URS Greiner to make revenue
projections without a fare collections or enforcement plan in effect?" Clearly not. As
has been previously discussed, the URS Greiner report avoids the implications
of willingness to pay fares by discussing a convoluted system where riders
would "perceive" that their trips were "free." They further propose an ill-thought-out
scheme whereby hotels would pay up front for tickets, distribute them to
patrons, then are left to their own devices to actually collect revenues. Further, the Wilbur Smith letter completely
avoids this critical issue. This
has the makings of a financial disaster.
There is a significant disconnect between the precisely proposed
patronage estimates and the disorganized and poorly planned fare collection system. While the patronage and fare revenue
forecasts are reassuringly specific, the actual fare collection system and
actual advertising revenues, if any are discussed in a haphazard and
ill-thought-out manner. We are not
aware of commitments by major convention or hotels - not even hotels with
stations on the proposed monorail - to buy tickets in bulk and distribute them
to their guests. Nor are we aware of
hotel plans to provide their guests with smart cards, with rides paid for in
advance or upon check-out. Nor, do we
believe, are hotels themselves aware of any scheme by which they would collect
fares from their guests and transfer these revenues to the monorail
operator. The inevitable conclusion is
that the monorail proponents do not have a clear idea how they are going to
actually collect the revenue essential to pay the costs of the proposed
system. "Are the ridership projections reasonable at the fares
indicated?" Absolutely not. It is abundantly
clear that, especially with the proposed increase to $2.50 for a short, one-way
trip in lieu of the current no-fare system, that the monorail ridership
forecasts are self-promoting rather than impartial and accurate. There is a consensus amongst reviewers of this
proposed project that 25,000 - 29,000 daily patrons is a generous estimate, not
the 50,000-plus claimed by the proponents. When
all is said and done, we believe there is no solid evidence that this
proposed monorail project is capable of overturning the past half-century of
public transit finance experience.
There is no solid evidence, as opposed to projections,
assumptions and unsubstantiated forecasts, that the ridership forecasts and
fare collection schemes are anything more than expensive daydreams. The recent Wilbur Smith letter is careful to
point out, for instance, that no actual counts of existing travel underlie the
URS trip tables used in the analysis.
Their comment (page 4 of their letter) is "WSA is unable to comment of the reasonableness
of the resulting forecasts." We
believe that there is no solid evidence sufficient to convince a prudent
person, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the State of Nevada should risk its
reputation on the $600 million bond issue - which the project sponsors refuse
to guarantee - and which we believe, is clearly destined for insolvency. This is the largest State issued bond issue
in Nevada's history. At the very least,
the State should require project sponsors MGM Grand and Park Place
Entertainment to guarantee the bonds, as is current policy for Stated-issued
housing and other bonds. Very truly yours, Jon
Twichell/Associates Wendell Cox Consultancy Professor Bernard
Malamud Thomas A. Rubin, CPA Ridership Consultant
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