Review of Sound Transit: How Independent?
From: Emory Bundy
Subject: RE: The Benefits of Sound Transit
Date: Friday, 13 October, 2000 16:20
Members of the Fourth Estate: Yesterday evening
I had a telephone message from David Quigg, of the News Tribune,
asking what I thought about Sound Transit's announcement yesterday
that it would have an independent review of Capitol Hill tunnel
costs. As the issue is extremely important, and the
announcement--as far as it goes--encouraging, I would like to share
my response more broadly. It comes accompanied with a heartfelt
appeal that professionals in the news business pay close
attention.
I didn't receive your call until late last night, David.
It's a positive move--providing it's a serious initiative, and
not merely a controlled PR ploy. It's not a good sign that the
critics weren't consulted, and no input about personnel or scope has
been solicited. There has been a deficient history regarding
Sound Transit's objectivity and openness, which I will summarize
briefly, below.
Sane Transit's position is affirmative with respect to the
announcement, while seeking assurances that a) the study will
genuinely be independent, which means independent experts and their
own staff; b) the study include all costs of Link,, and not be
limited only to issues of Capitol Hill tunnel costs; c) attention be
paid to whether, whatever the costs are, they can be managed under
existing subarea equity policies, and d) scrutiny be given to the
relative costs of other high-capacity options.
Speaking personally, here are past items that prompt
wariness:
1. As an RTA committee member, I beseeched chairman Dick
Ford and executive director Bob White that RTA commission one or more
independent economic analyses of its prospective 1996 transit
plan. This call was made in advance of adoption of that plan,
then repeated subsequently. An independent study was not
commissioned by RTA, though one would have thought RTA should have
been interested in the economic merits of its proposal, and their
objective validation. [The letters are lengthy, but I will
append them at the conclusion of this note, FYI. I submit they
demonstrate a serious and objective pursuit and concern on my part,
which so far has not been reciprocated by Dick Ford or Bob
White. Whether RTA board members were informed, and
complicitous in the resulting misrepresentations, I don't know.]
Since RTA failed to act, Don Padelford and I did commission such
a study, by an outstanding team, ECONorthwest and Washington Research
Council ("Benefit-Cost Analysis of RTA Plan," October
1996). The study's analytical methodology was confirmed by a
prestigious national panel of five economists and transportation
planners. RTA then surreptitiously commissioned its own
economic consulting firm, Porter & Associates, to secretly do a
parallel study, which, by using inflated benefits and understated
costs, purported to confirm there was, on balance, positive merit to
RTA's 1996 proposal. It released its report two days before the
ECONorthwest study was released. Both these studies are
available, and anyone who takes the trouble to check it out will
confirm the above--but the media elected to relegate the exercise to
irrelevance, on the grounds that there were competing studies, take
your pick.
The difference, I submit, is that one study sought the truth,
and the other sought to obscure it. This was my personal
introduction into Sound Transit's modus operandi.
2. The Expert Review Panel had some good people on it, but
RTA/Sound Transit controlled the agenda, the questions to be
addressed, the framing of the questions, and the staff. A
number of ERP members, at the time, chaffed at the constraints, and I
suspect more of them would in retrospect.
As for the ridership projections, as you know, Sound Transit
will not permit anyone to have access to the models, so there is no
opportunity for independent review. The media seem, again, not
to take any interest in gaining access to pertinent information, and
are not bothered by it being withheld. Meanwhile, an energetic
citizen, Michael Weidler, has disaggregated, from the ground up,
patronage on all bus lines that serve Rainier Valley, First/Capitol
Hill, and U District, and simply can't fathom where the claimed
quotient of riders will come from. Per usual, this could be
more sensibly addressed if Sound Transit made information generated
at public expense available to the public.
3. The Citizens Oversight Panel is hand-picked by Sound
Transit, and staffed by Sound Transit. Critics are
systematically excluded. Even so, even that body has become
increasingly concerned about the trend of events.
4. You received my earlier commentary (September 14) about
the so-called independent review of Link by Diversified Capital,
Inc. The tip-off of its "independence" is the
concession, on page one, that "Since data provided by Sound
Transit were assumed to be accurate, any inherent limitations, errors
or irregularities that occurred may not be detected."
DCI's study was rooted in a cost estimate of $1.9 billion--when
Sound Transit itself has acknowledged additional, committed costs of
$230 million (1995$), the largest one being purchase of the downtown
tunnel. In spite of the study's conveyance to Congress in
September, 2000--when the severe cost overruns on the Capitol Hill
tunnel bids were known--the DCI study presumes the tunnel bid would
be within the $509 million budgeted, with about 10 percent more
available for cost overruns. Then DCI did what it described as
an "unlikely scenario" that included a 10 percent cost
overrun, and concluded that, with difficulty, Sound Transit could
manage it. This, to repeat, when Sound Transit KNEW that it
already had accumulated $230 million more in obligations, plus a
tunnel bid hundreds of millions of dollars beyond the figure
budgeted. In short, the cost estimate should have been in the
range of $2.4 billion, not $1.9 billion--and even $2.4 billion
will prove to be seriously understated, given known deficiencies in
the budgeting of relocation costs in the Rainier Valley, the Beacon
Hill tunnel, conversion of the downtown tunnel, relocation of utility
infrastructure, and UW land acquisition.
5. The claim that converting the downtown tunnel from
buses to trains will enhance its transit capacity is false, and
easily can be shown to be false. The document that purports to
show otherwise, "Downtown Seattle Transit Operations"
(October 8, 1999), does so by failing to acknowledge that enhanced
transit capacity via rail requires a) trains can be packed, but all
bus passengers must be seated, b) two separate train lines, each
coming every four minutes (too fast for non-separated light rail
lines) have to neatly mesh into two-minute headways, which is simply
too close for safety, and, even given a) and b), c) the entire scheme
also depends upon the completion of a new rail bridge across Lake
Washington, generally in the I-90 corridor, which fact is
unmentioned, and for which there is no current approval, financial
mechanism, or demonstrated political support, and which has been
thrice defeated by voters.
6. A diverse array of 88 local citizens made a call for an
independent financial review, September 6. They proposed to
share costs, assure objectivity through joint participation of Sound
Transit and concerned citizens, and offered a streamlined process,
with a jointly-selected, outside expert chairman, which could be
completed within three months. That means, had it been accepted
by Sound Transit, the review would have been completed in
December. It was immediately denounced by Sound Transit, with a
press event the same day, and a claim that it would slow the process
down. Note that a genuinely independent review would have been
completed well before Sound Transit's initiative will get seriously
underway.
So, while I welcome the prospect of any review, there is an
acute need for Sound Transit to establish its bona fides, given its
record, and a similarly acute need for the media to be probing in its
coverage.
The letters:
COPY
May 7, 1996
Dick Ford
Chairman, RTA Regional Outreach Committee
c/o Preston Gates & Ellis
701 Fifth Avenue
Seattle, Washington 98104-7078
Dear Dick:
With the receipt of the RTA's report, Economic benefits, system
use and transportation impacts of the RTA ten-year system
plan (April 24, 1996) I have received sufficient information
to conclude that the proposed plan, if adopted, would be a disservice
to the region. I therefore oppose it, will vote against it, and
as a citizen urge others to do likewise. Whereas hypothetically
changes could be made before the RTA Board's final decision May 31st
that would cause me to change my mind, that seems far-fetched given
the fundamental problems of the proposal.
On April 15th I wrote you that I could not make a decision on the
proposal until its benefits had been described so they could be
related to the costs, and that I was unsettled that the Regional
Outreach Committee was drafting a supporting statement without having
before it an estimate of those benefits. I added,
"Once a clear picture is presented of what the investment can be
expected to accomplish I will seek expert assistance in answering two
fundamental questions: Are the calculated costs and benefits
reasonable? And will the services/ridership added to the
transit and high-occupancy vehicles of the region be commensurate
with the added costs, both capital and operating? My support or
lack of support for the proposition will be determined by those
answers."
Because of the short time remaining prior to the RTA's final
decision, I proceeded on the assumption that the cost and ridership
estimates of the RTA are reasonable.
I turned to the best source of expert assistance, the economic
consulting firm, ECONorthwest. It was engaged by the Puget
Sound Regional Council as consultant on its "Integrated
Transportation Planning" inquiry -- an exercise in how to
identify and compare transportation costs, in order to work toward
efficient, beneficial decisions. It worked closely with a
distinguished expert panel including figures from the John A. Volpe
National Transportation Institute, Washington State Department of
Transportation, University of Washington School of Engineering,
Northwest Power Planning Council, and the Public Policy Center,
University of Iowa. Accordingly, ECONorthwest is conversant
with the economics and the particular transportation planning issues
of this metropolitan area.
Here is the conclusion:
[T]he region would be worse off by $1 billion if the RTA built the
proposed system than if it did nothing at all. Remember this is
using the RTA's own estimates of benefits which we think are probably
too high. All we did was exclude the categories that our expert
review panel for the PSRC project said should not be included in
these types of evaluations and do a proper present value
calculation.
The RTA's document, Economic
benefits, system use and transportation impacts of the RTA ten-year
system plan, was disappointing -- no, disillusioning.
It purported to present, under the imprimatur of the Regional Transit
Authority -- a distinguished body of elected public officials -- a
competent, fair calculation of the benefits of the RTA plan. It
is not a serious piece of work, it would not stand the scrutiny of
dispassionate transportation economists, and it is discrediting to
the institution that presented it. It is hype. It
overstates. It misrepresents. It double counts. It
omits facts that are inconvenient and exaggerates when it suits its
purposes.
I cannot fully summarize the shortcomings, but will give some
examples:
1. The RTA claims that $92 million worth of time per year will
be saved by transit users, if the proposed system is built --
yet those savings are not offset in the slightest by the fact that
walking and transfer times tend to increase with a system like the
one proposed, and that the value of people's walking and waiting time
is twice that of their in-vehicle time. Also, there will be a
huge volume of unaccounted time lost due to major disruptions during
the ten years of construction.
2. According to the RTA the region will receive a $70
million yearly benefit [mid-range estimate] by the construction and
related employment created by the project -- and there is no
estimated, offsetting loss in employment resulting from the
fact that the disposable incomes of the people of the region will be
reduced by hundreds of millions of dollars per year.
3. The RTA asserts that the people of the region will
save $52 million annually in vehicle ownership, operating and
insurance costs -- a legitimate benefit, but calculated at $.40
per mile which is much higher than that used in other studies.
4. The RTA says the reduced delays for private and
commercial vehicles will be worth $20 million per year to the economy
-- a legitimate benefit, but overstated; latent demand tends to
increase congestion and minimize timesaving; the figure used for the
value of commercial travel, $100 per hour, is nearly twice what is
considered reasonable.
5. The RTA will add $20 million per year in tourist
expenditures -- the transit system is unlikely to influence
tourist visits.
Relying on its extravagant assumptions, the RTA concludes
that it will swiftly recompense the region for its investment, and
from that point make a positive contribution to the regional
economy:
...the total measurable benefit [of the ten-year RTA plan] exceeds
the total accumulated cost by about 2015.
I do not believe that statement will, by an exceedingly wide
margin, stand serious scrutiny. An added disquiet I now have is
that, if the claimed benefits are overstated and misrepresented, can
people have confidence in the construction cost estimates and
estimated ridership? Serious cost overruns are common in urban
rail projects -- particularly when tunneling is involved. The
technical challenges of tunneling under the Lake Washington Ship
Canal, Capitol Hill, and First Hill are daunting. That is why
business people on the East Side are so determined that there be a
"firewall" built around the tunnel project -- so the risk
and responsibility will be borne solely by the taxpayers of
Seattle/North King County. (It was reported to me that at a
recent public meeting, a resident of Issaquah expressed concern about
the cost and viability of the tunnel. The RTA representative
did not defend the project; he simply reassured her that she,
a resident of Issaquah, did not need to concern herself.)
A great disservice will be done to the people and businesses of this
region if an official document of purported benefits of the RTA plan
is put forth that does not competently present a reasonable
estimation of true benefits. That could prompt the voters and
policymakers to make an unwise and imprudent decision. I am
proposing that ECONorthwest do a more extensive analysis. I
make this further suggestion to you: That you, as chair of the
RTA Regional Outreach Committee, commission an impartial body to
select two or three prestigious, independent transportation
economists to carefully review the RTA's claimed benefits, and for
each economist to report his/her conclusions.
Before closing, I want to revisit the reasons why, from the start of
my appointment to the Regional Outreach Committee, I urged that
careful attention be paid to the costs and benefits -- to the merits
-- of any proposals:
o The entire RTA process seems wedded to a facile,
a priori assumption that contemporary rail technology is
well-suited to the transit needs of American cities, like
Seattle. Yet the scholarly literature casts grave doubt on that
proposition, and generally concludes that prospective urban rail
projects should be approached with great caution. The most
definitive, broadest-based contemporary study of urban American
transportation, Avoiding the Collision of Cities and
Cars: Urban Transportation Policy for the Twenty-first
Century (American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and The Aspen
Institute: 1993), reached the following conclusion:
Given the overall record of investment in rail transit over the
last twenty years, the participants do not generally favor additional
such investment in the present price environment.
o During the
past 30 years Boston, Massachusetts, has developed an urban transit
infrastructure very much like that proposed by the RTA.
(Remembering that the RTA's current proposal is "phase
one.") According to the definitive study of a
highly-regarded scholar from Harvard University's Graduate School of
Design, Dr. Jose Gomez-Ibanez, Big-City Transit Ridership,
Deficits, and Politics: Avoiding Reality in Boston
(American Planning Association Journal: Winter 1996),
the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority's impressive investments in
rail over the past three decades have had the following result:
Transit ridership has been just about even -- hence its marketshare
has plummeted -- and the annual transit subsidy has grown from $21
million to $575 million! Further, the MBTA is facing a
fiscal crisis at this moment, because the yearly $575 million subsidy
does not fully cover its costs. New taxes will have to be
imposed -- because, once service is instituted, and people's lives
and businesses adjust to rely on it, it is near-impossible to undo,
no matter the burden.
o Several times
during our committee's deliberations it has been declared that some
measures that may be exceedingly efficient and beneficial, starting
with price signals like congestion pricing or the phasing out of
parking subsidies (two measures that rank high in the recommendations
of the Avoiding the Collision of Cities and Cars
report), or converting existing SOV lanes to HOV (as on the 520
bridge), cannot be done -- because they are too
controversial. Instead, we should persuade voters and taxpayers
to advance $3.7 billion, plus carry a long-term debt, plus bear
dramatic increases in operating and maintenance costs -- for a very
dubious result. Professor Gomez-Ibanez has a sage warning we
should take to heart:
One natural response to a difficult public problem is to avoid
it. If there is
no politically palatable solution, it may be in no one's interest to
take the issue on, or perhaps even to acknowledge it exists.
o Next week an interesting trial opens in Los
Angeles. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund has brought a class
action suit against the Metropolitan Transit Authority. The
cause of the suit is the MTA's rail project. In carrying out
its ambitious rail plan the capital costs and operating costs have
been so burdensome that the MTA has diverted funds away from bus
service. Accordingly, a relatively small number of
higher-income, suburban train riders are traveling in
lavishly-subsidized style while bus service for in-city and
lower-income people is deteriorating. Not only is there
an equity issue involved, as the LA rail project has proceeded
the absolute number of LA transit riders -- on buses plus
trains -- has decreased by 20%!
o Steve Fitzroy, a senior transportation planner
for the Puget Sound Regional Council's until 1995, worked closely
with the previous RTA proposal. Because of his background
knowledge -- and the fact that he now lives and works elsewhere, so
is free to give his unalloyed assessment -- I wrote and asked his
opinion of the current RTA proposal. His reply:
The burden of servicing the ongoing operating debit (not to
mention the financing of the required capital improvements for the
RTA's plan) will require a level of inter-governmental cooperation
that will make the effort to pass the current capital referendum seem
like child's play. And the second guessing that will accompany
the inevitable shortfall in expected ridership on any new rail-based
transit system will undermine any political agreement reached for
financing both capital and operating indebtedness. If you, or
one of the members of the [Dick] Ford committee were to take a
realistic look at the full costs of investment in even a modest rail
proposal, I'm sure that you would find that amortized capital costs
would soon be overwhelmed by financing the annual debit of operating
even under somewhat optimistic ridership estimates (and become a
nightmare using the "no significant ridership growth"
scenario that has played out in every major metropolitan area that
has introduced rail systems in the last quarter
century).
Dick, my decision to oppose the RTA proposal does not in the
slightest stem from a lack of awareness that this region has a
transportation crisis. Nor from an unwillingness to support
taxes and public investments to address it. To the contrary, I
fervently believe we have a transportation crisis and that it is
deteriorating at an alarming rate. I believe we are far too
reliant on the automobile and that a good public transit system is
critically important for the region -- and absolutely essential for
the significant part of the population that is utterly dependent on
transit for mobility. I am more than willing to support tax
increases, local and state, to address those needs, providing the
investments are sound applications of public resources, that will
effectively address the problem. That's the
test the RTA's proposal fails.
For several years I have tried to convince the RTA to proceed with
close attention to the most cost-effective measures. I have
encouraged the Regional Outreach Committee to consider "least
cost planning" or "integrated transportation planning"
as a useful tool that should be applied. I feel a sense of
failure in not managing to persuade either the RTA or the Regional
Outreach Committee to focus more attention on the cost and benefit
issues. I have a high personal estimation of RTA chairman Bob
Drewel and his predecessor, Bruce Laing; of Seattle City Council's
RTA representative, Martha Choe; and of you, among others; and have
no doubts that all of you are trying to do something that will
benefit this region. I believe, with the current RTA proposal,
a serious mistake has been made and that we need to go back to the
drawing board. The nub of the problem, I think, has been an
unbending commitment to rail, regardless, and a disinclination to
face problems squarely and broaden thinking. For instance,
since there does not appear to be a way to run a rail line from the
University District to downtown Seattle at a reasonable cost, it is
imperative to think of an alternative to doing so.
Finally, I know that many people support rail out of a desperation
that a crisis is upon us and they can see no other alternative to the
automobile. Unfortunately, the combination of desperation and
hope drives us to invest heavily in a technology that simply is not
(with few exceptions) increasing the marketshare of transit riders or
holding costs within reasonable bounds. We have better
options. The technology is available to create transit systems
that overcome the fundamental shortcomings of existing rail
technology -- too costly and too inflexible to collect and distribute
people within urban areas, given the modest densities that
characterize almost all American cities. Rather than continuing
to make huge investments that bring marginal returns, the urban
transit authorities of America should express their active interest
in the development of transit technologies that can deliver service
superior to trains at dramatically lower cost -- and define the
criteria of cost and service they require as a condition of their
investments.
The front-piece quote to Avoiding the Collision of Cities and
Cars, taken from Henry Bessemer, inventor of the steel-making
process that bears his name, is apt:
I had an immense advantage over many others dealing with the
problem, inasmuch as I had no fixed ideas derived from
long-established practice to
control and bias my mind, and did not suffer from the general belief
that whatever is, is right.
We need some fresh thinking, and a hard-headed willingness to be
directed by what works, not by what sells.
Respectfully,
Emory Bundy
PS: It occurs to me to add a note from an explicitly
environmental perspective. The production and use of energy is
of unparalleled significance to both the economy and the
environment. Sound energy policy is essential to the health of
both. Transportation is our leading consumer of energy -- and a
leading polluter and consumer of land, especially in urban
areas. Trains have a marked environmental advantage over
automobiles. But huge capital investments and substantial,
ongoing operating costs for urban rail systems that do not
significantly displace automobile use, diminish the opportunity and
fiscal capacity to undertake effective measures. We need to
utilize our existing transportation infrastructure more efficiently,
improve transit ridership, pursue more promising technologies, and
better support sublime transportation alternatives like bicycling and
walking. That is the course to a better environment and a
stronger economy.
June 10, 1996
Dick Ford, Chairman
RTA Regional Outreach Committee
Preston Gates & Ellis
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5000
Seattle, Washington 98104
Dear Dick and ROC Members:
cc: Bob
White, Executive Director
Regional Transit Authority
I was dismayed by Bob White's May 17th letter to you, at my apparent
failure to make clear my position on regional transportation.
So I would like to restate and clarify it:
1. 1995 Metropolitan Transportation Plan: As
indicated in my Minority Report, I favor the general approach
summarized in the Puget Sound Regional Council's 1995
Metropolitan Transportation Plan. It emphasized
increasing the efficiency with which we use the existing
transportation system, pricing strategies, better land use,
moderating demand through aggressive Transportation Demand Management
(TDM) strategies, improved public transit services, prudent
investments to support bicycling and walking, and necessary
investments in new road capacity in developing areas. It
emphasized "cost-effective" approaches.
2. Least-Cost Planning/Integrated Transportation
Planning: A conscientious pursuit of cost-effective
transportation measures requires a rigorous planning process (by
whatever name) seeking to optimize transportation investments.
The most fiscally effective and prudent measures should be accorded
highest priority. The region faces an alarming transportation
crisis, so it is critical that resources be applied in a timely
fashion to optimal effect.
3. Specific Recommendations: Having not had $50
million, staff, and years of planning time, I cannot put forth
precisely the alternate measures that would be prioritized by a fair,
unbiased, rigorous approach. But there is abundant evidence of
likely conclusions that would be reached by a cost-effective
approach, drawing on existing data and contemporary experience here
and elsewhere. It would start with measures to use existing
transportation capacity more efficiently. Some
examples:
a. TDM/Boeing: Boeing has responded in an
effective way to implement the state's commute reduction law.
It is ahead of schedule in its plan to reduce SOV commutes by its
workforce by 35%. That number will rival the number of new
transit riders projected for both the RTA's light rail and commuter
rail projects. The cost of Boeing's implementation is modest,
and substantially recompensed by the value of the land recovered from
parking lots. Boeing may be the nation's leading user of
vanpools, an exceedingly efficient transit investment. The
balance of the effort is being accomplished by offering employee bus
passes, incentives for carpooling, ride-matching services,
accommodations for bicyclists, and promotional efforts. Boeing
is but one company taking such measures, though it is distinguished
by its size and leadership. Besides laws, regulations, and
admonitions to employers, it may be worth it to the region to invest
substantial public funds in such measures-especially if the
alternative is enormously more costly.
b. TDM/U Pass: The University of Washington has
instituted an analogous set of measures, including a negotiated
arrangement with Metro assuring dramatic improvements in bus service
to the campus and heavily discounted fares. Cost for SOV
parking has been raised, and improved support for carpooling,
transit, and bicycling has been instituted. Costs are
substantially offset by increased parking fees and the avoided costs
of new parking structures. Neighboring communities and
businesses have benefited greatly from congestion relief. More
progress can be made-but already the reduction in SOV use rivals
that projected for the RTA's $669 million commuter rail project (plus
financing costs and a $3-$5 subsidy per rider). And the benefit
is now, not a decade off.
c. TDM/tax incentives: Senator Kathleen Drew's
bill, adopted by the State Legislature, provides $1.5 million in tax
incentives to support efforts of businesses of any size to
reduce SOV utilization by employees. It will induce by
incentive what the commute reduction law pursues by regulation.
It predicts the reduction of 16,000 commute SOVs in four years.
That will remove two-thirds as many cars as the RTA's light rail
project, in one-third the time, at one-900ths the cost. Sen.
Drew may be optimistic about the cost relative to benefits.
Perhaps it will take several times $1.5 million to remove 16,000
cars. Even so, it is a trivial sum compared to the proposed
rail's operating cost, much less its capital cost. As the plan
unfolds and experience accumulates, it will prove wise to set far
higher targets for SOV reduction through tax incentives.
d. Pedestrians and bicycles: Transportation
planner William Eager advocates that we invest in bicycling to the
extent it is cost-effective to do so. We don't. Even
so, the number of pedestrian/cycling trips in our region, today,
approaches the number served by transit. With modest, targeted
investments such trips could be expanded substantially. 70% of
the trips taken in this region are no more than five miles, well
within the reach of a healthy individual with a bicycle. Similarly
affluent communities in Europe demonstrate the possibilities.
Furthermore, pedestrians and cyclists pay all their own operating
costs and impose virtually no adverse impacts on the environment.
e. Pricing strategies: Mr. White reports that for
now elected officials are not prepared to proceed with congestion
pricing. While there is a great deal to recommend congestion
pricing, it is but one in an arsenal of pricing strategies that
deserve consideration. Employers who are cashing out employees'
free parking, so they no longer subsidize SOV and penalize
alternatives, are engaged in pricing strategies. As is the U
Pass. Granted, much public education is needed about
pricing, and good planning. Suggesting that a multi-billion
dollar capital investment in two rail projects, for a hoped-for
37,000 new transit riders* will alleviate congestion-with
all objective evidence to the contrary-is the kind of
misinformation that makes realistic adaptations more
difficult.
f. Buses: The RTA could protest that it is charged
only with serving high-capacity transit. And it is true that
effective TDM measures will place additional burdens on transit --
which, even with improved efficiency, will require new
capacity. The RTA's Economic benefits, system use and
transportation impacts of the RTA ten-year system plan
claims this region will increase transit ridership 47% between now
and 2010 if its $3.9 billion plan is implemented. But that is a
deceptive claim. Consider the following:
i. Do nothing: While the 47% figure is impressive,
it is standard practice to show where the region would be in 2010 if
we "do nothing"-that is, keep advancing what we already
are doing, with existing plans and resources. The RTA's report
fails to do that. A disaggregation of the 47% claim will
demonstrate that a major part of it will be accomplished by the
ongoing efforts of the transit systems, within the existing tax
structure. It is deceptive for the RTA to obscure that
fact.
ii. RTA/Buses: If one further disaggregates the
RTA's numbers, the major additional transit passengers between now
and 2010 will be the result of added investment in buses, not
rail. The bus investments, including streamlined services and
new capacity, are more cost-effective.
g. HOV: While there are questions about the
best way to complete the HOV system, and allocate costs, it
represents a regional transportation investment markedly superior to
either the light rail or commuter rail.
h. Rail: Rail is a transportation mode deserving
consideration along with other modes. When analysis indicates
that its amortized plus operating cost, in relation to service
provided, is superior to alternatives, it deserves support. In
general, however, the performance of new intraurban rail projects in
America has been disappointing, the victim of high capital costs,
dispersed settlement patterns, and the omnipresence of the
automobile. Even so, there are some promising examples of
rail-especially when existing rail corridors can be put into
service at competitive cost. If we find comparable
opportunities in the Puget Sound region they will merit
support. Based on the RTA's cost and ridership projections, it
is abundantly clear that the proposed rail plans do not represent
attractive opportunities.
i. New technology: I do not agree with Mr. White
that there is no place for new technology as a substitute to
contemporary intraurban rail technology. I believe exactly the
opposite. But it also is likely that when we have a
cost-effective technology that can efficiently collect and distribute
people, it will alter the economics of rail in a positive
direction. My basic point is that it makes no sense to
introduce a technology into circumstances for which it is
demonstrably ill-suited-and transit agencies ought to declare clear
cost and performance criteria that will help guide and encourage the
development of appropriate technology. (That's what an airline
would do-it wouldn't knowingly buy off-the-shelf equipment
guaranteed to diminish its financial health.)
4. Anecdotal comments vs. "the unique features" of
the Central Puget Sound region: Mr. White takes me to task
for what he says are anecdotal comments, with reference to Boston and
Los Angeles. Let me retrace what in fact I said. First I
cited an authoritative and extensive review of contemporary US
transportation, which reached the following conclusion:
Given the overall record of investment in rail transit over the
last twenty years, the participants do not generally favor additional
such investment in the present price environment.
The study, Avoiding the Collision of Cities and Cars: Urban
Transportation Policy for the Twenty-first Century (1993),
was sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the
Aspen Institute. It engaged eminent transportation planners,
urban planners, economists, lawyers, business experts, civil
engineers, environmental scholars, and energy experts from the
following institutions: Harvard University, Brookings
Institution, University of Southern California, University of
California at Berkeley, Union of Concerned Scientists, University of
California at Irvine, World Resources Institute, Yale University,
Brandeis University, Kirkland & Ellis, UCLA, Surface
Transportation Policy Project, University of Texas, Rails to Trails
Conservancy, AeroVironment Inc., Environmental Defense Fund, and
University of California at Davis.
I illustrated the general point with two relevant examples, Boston
and Los Angeles.
Mr. White appears to argue that the Seattle area is unique in some
undefined way that will enable it to avoid the consequences that have
befallen other cities that have instituted similar measures.
(The consequences are much higher costs, usually without any gain in
marketshare.) The fundamental problem that afflicts other
cities-and will afflict Seattle-is breathtakingly simple:
Since transit is highly subsidized, the scale of its use is
encapsulated by the level of subsidy. (In King County, taxes
pay 75% of Metro's $200 million-plus annual budget, riders pay but
25%.) If you take a highly-subsidized transit technology (bus),
and overlay a significantly more costly intraurban transit
technology (rail), the invariable result is higher taxes without a
commensurate benefit.
5. "Is it bad public policy to [give] the public a
service for which they have voted and are willing to tax
themselves?" So asks Mr. White in response to my
observation that many people do not have an appreciation of the
costs/benefits of urban rail systems (especially those that involve
tunneling), and as a result are calling for wildly unrealistic
projects. Under those conditions, yes, it is bad public
policy. And if those in positions of responsibility and access
to professional expertise and data fail to forthrightly acquaint
voters with the best available information-worse, if they pander to
wishful thinking, and mislead people-it is very bad public policy
indeed, and a violation of public trust.
Further, it doesn't move us towards a workable response to the
transportation challenges we face. Harvard University's
Professor Jose Gomez-Ibanez started his article about Boston transit,
started with the following observation:
One natural response to a difficult public problem is to avoid
it. If there is no politically palatable solution, it may be in
no one's interest to take the issue on, or perhaps even to
acknowledge it exists...In the end, however, problems that keep
growing cannot be ignored, and delays may add to the cost and
difficulty of the eventual solution....
This pattern of avoiding hard choices is being repeated in the debate
over public transportation ridership, service, and finance in most
major United State metropolitan areas. The basic problem is how
to maintain or increase public transport ridership without widening
the gap between transit costs and passenger revenues; this gap, which
we call the transit deficit, is usually financed by the
taxpayer. In the last several decades most metropolitan areas
have been promoting public transportation as a way to reduce traffic
congestion, control air pollution by automobiles, and preserve the
mobility of citizens who do not have ready access to
automobiles. At the same time, however, the underlying
economics of mass transit have been deteriorating, as real incomes
rise and jobs and residences move to the suburbs.
6. ECONorthwest: Mr. White dismissed the
economic review of ECONorthwest. He did not refute a single
fact or assumption presented. The cost assumptions attributed
to the RTA are explicitly taken from the RTA's report, Economic
benefits, system use and transportation impacts of the RTA ten-year
system plan (April 24, 1996). The analytical
assumptions ECONorthwest used are those devised by a distinguished
expert panel convened by the Puget Sound Regional Council, including
figures from the John A. Volpe National Transportation Institute,
Washington State Department of Transportation, University of
Washington School of Engineering, Northwest Power Planning Council,
and the Public Policy Center, University of Iowa. ECONorthwest
was the PSRC's consultant on the project. Then ECONorthwest
used the standard methods of transportation economists to calculate
the value of the RTA's proposed investment over time. While the
RTA has clearly not sought to optimize transportation
investments-and in that sense has fallen short of what I would
prefer-it has only been in the course of this process that it
has come to light that its plan likely will cause affirmative
harm to the region's economy. That is, it will cost
substantially more than any plausible benefit that will be
realized.
Granted, ECONorthwest's analysis was a rough estimate, produced
quickly. How could it be otherwise? The RTA only
submitted its case on April 24, 1996, the Regional Outreach Committee
was to conclude its recommendations on May 17, and the RTA board was
to make its final decision May 31. Given the stakes involved
the issues merit closer scrutiny.
But it is the RTA that controls the $50
million in public funds allocated for study and community
participation. The RTA virtually monopolizes the data, and
resources for review. It has an Expert Review Panel, but the
panel was hand-picked, and not all of its members are truly
independent. Bob White did not comment on my plea to Dick
Ford:
That you, as chair of the RTA Regional
Outreach Committee, commission an impartial body to select two or
three prestigious, independent transportation economists to
carefully review the RTA's claimed benefits, and for each economist
to report his/her conclusions.
Mr. White claims that the RTA's proposal "will stand the intense
scrutiny of outside experts." Let's test it. Let's
use a tiny portion of the public funds to commission two or
three independent transportation economists to review the RTA's case,
as summarized in its Economic benefits, system use and
transportation impacts of the RTA ten-year system plan (April
24, 1996), and ECONorthwest's admittedly rough and swiftly produced
analysis of it. Select the experts in a manner that will
inspire the confidence of RTA advocates and skeptics alike.
Keep the issue focused, keep the cost modest, and get the reviews
done promptly. Fully report all findings.
With $3.9 billion of public funds in the balance, plus weighty issues
of lost time, lost opportunities, and public trust, this issue
deserves to be confronted and resolved. Is indeed the RTA
sufficiently confident of its case that it will enable it to be
independently reviewed and evaluated?
Respectfully,
Emory Bundy
* When the RTA claims a "new rider" it
means a one-way rider, while a "new bicycle commuter," or a
"new vanpool rider," or a "new carpool rider"
commutes from home to work and back again. So the RTA's
estimate of 32,000 "new riders" on light rail and 5,000
"new riders" on commuter rail is equal to 18,500 "new
riders" when one uses the English language in a conventional
manner.
(c) 2000 www.publicpurpose.com --- Wendell Cox Consultancy --- Permission granted to use with attribution.
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