For many years, public transport authorities have extolled the theoretical ability of public transport to accomplish the important public policy objectives of reducing traffic congestion, air pollution and energy consumption. But the results have fallen short of the theory. The failure to deliver on these promises arises from two factors ---over-selling of public transport's capabilities and failure to employ the most cost effective approaches. If public transport is to successfully compete for public funding the theoretical claims must be more realistic and resources must be managed more effectively.

THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT

Public transport operates in a challenging environment. Around the world, governments are faced with serious financial difficulties. Demands for higher levels of public service, new public services and limitations on public funding have intensified the competition for public funding.

The consumer environment is more challenging. As nations become affluent, public transport loses market share to the automobile. This market share loss has two causes; demographic and psychological. Demographically, as nations become more affluent their urban areas decline in residential and employment density. This results in dispersion of travel destinations, weakening public transport corridors. Psychologically, as nations become more affluent, people tend to use automobiles more, not only because they are a rational response to urban development patterns, but also because the automobile is more than transportation ---it is a symbol of personal freedom and affluence. It does little good to revile the automobile. The automobile is here to stay. In free societies (which all appear likely to become), people freely choose how to travel. People will not be coerced into public transport; they have to be attracted; and the automobile is a formidable competitor.

Public transport is losing the competition rather badly. In New Zealand, Australia, the United States and Canada, public transport market share is dropping dramatically. In Europe, with petrol prices up to double that of New Zealand, public transport's market share is static or declining in most large urban areas, despite the existence and expansion of comprehensive urban rail systems. Further, the future is likely to be more challenging in Europe, because a large percentage of public transport ridership is older women who drive automobiles in much smaller numbers than younger women (whose driving patterns are virtually identical to those of younger men). Public transport's failure to divert large numbers of drivers from automobiles has doubtless been a major reason why governments have begun to discard subsidy driven approaches.

Public transport has failed to efficiently use the public resources entrusted to it. Public transport unit operating costs have risen inordinately. This is not surprising, since inordinate cost escalation is inherent to monopoly, and most public transport in affluent nations has been provided by public monopolies. In the unregulated public monopoly environment, "de facto" proprietary interest has been held by public transport management and labor, whose benefit has been served in preference to that of riders, taxpayers and the community. As a result, governments are discarding public monopoly approaches and substituting service methods that incorporate competition and bring improved cost control.

New Zealand has been a leader in these trends, discarding subsidy driven approaches, incorporating competition and reorganizing public transport service delivery to ensure that those in charge of public transport design have no proprietary interest in operating service.

THE PURPOSE OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT

For public transport to provide maximum benefit to the community, there should be a clear understanding of its public purpose. Public transport is supported by taxpayers and ratepayers:

-to serve a social need by facilitating mobility for the disadvantaged (those without access to automobiles by virtue of low income or disability) and

-to serve an environmental need by providing an alternative to the automobile and thereby reducing traffic congestion, air pollution and energy consumption.

If public transport is legitimately a public service, then the public money entrusted to it must be committed, without dilution, to the achievement of the public purpose. For whatever level of taxpayer, ratepayer and passenger expenditure, the highest level of safe and quality service should be obtained.

Achieving the public purpose requires that public transport officials set out specific objectives. Public transport policy should seek to accomplish specific levels of mobility for the disadvantaged and to obtain a specific urban travel market share (depending on the community, this might be to increase, maintain or control the decline of public transport's market share). It is important that public transport objectives relate to the context of an urban area or a corridor. For example, mere trends in ridership are less important than ridership trends in relation to the urban travel market (market share).

To accomplish its objectives, public transport must put itself in the place of customers. Customers are interested in getting from one place to the other quickly and conveniently. They are attracted by service that is nearby, frequent, quick, and which takes them to where they want to go. People will be diverted from automobiles only by public transport that duplicates the flexibility of the automobile. The particular mode of public transport is not important. The customer of public transport is purchasing mobility, not technology.

One planning approach is for the public transport authority to develop a "mobility policy," setting forth minimum standards for geographical access (distance to public transport), service frequency and travel time.

MEASURING PUBLIC TRANSPORT PERFORMANCE

There are two fundamental dimensions to public transport performance. The first is effectiveness ---the extent to which the public transport system achieves its public policy objectives. The second is efficiency ---provision of services at the lowest cost.

In New Zealand, public transport officials will be able to concentrate their attention on effectiveness. Conversion to competitive operation of public transport, through commercial services and competitive tendering, will ensure that services are produced cost efficiently (at market prices).

The fundamental issue for public transport officials in New Zealand, then, is to ensure that public subsidies to public transport are effectively used. Various measures should be employed to assess the effectiveness of public transport, such as:

Public transport market share or public transport work trip market share (by urban area or corridor within urban area): Measures of market share provide information on the performance of public transport relative to the travel market in urban areas or particular corridors. A related indicator is vehicle occupancy rate.

Subsidy per passenger: This measure can assist authorities in comparing the effectiveness of subsidizing particular services.

Performance indicators should be used by government to establish the funding priority of public transport relative to other public services. Local public transport authorities should also review the short and long term trends of performance indicators, and make comparisons with performance indicators and trends in other urban areas (with appropriate caveats to account for contextual differences between urban areas).

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

There are three primary public transport trends occurring in western nations.

The first trend is substitution of the competitive market for public monopoly in service provision. This trend usually involves de-monopolization of public transport subsidies through competitive tendering. In some cases, as in New Zealand, it may also involve free entry by commercial operators into public transport markets. Conversions to competitive systems are underway or completed in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway, and are beginning in the US, Australia, Canada and South Africa. National or provincial conversions are being considered in other nations as well.

The second trend is separation of policy from operations. To ensure a fair environment in which public and private providers compete without preference, public transport organizations that competitively tender for service are being prohibited from competing for tenders themselves, as former operating divisions are corporatized or privatized. A crucial and as yet uncompleted step in the national public transport regulatory reform is true separation of policy from operations without incumbent preference in the Auckland area.

The third trend is reduction of public transport subsidies. The elimination, reduction or limitation of national subsidies in some nations is of particular significance, as government ministries become more aware of the fact that local governments are more prudent with locally raised taxes than with nationally raised taxes. Subsidies are being limited or reduced in the United Kingdom, Norway, Italy, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, the US and other nations.

STRATEGIES FOR ACHIEVING THE PUBLIC PURPOSE

In public transport's challenging environment, strategies must be carefully chosen to obtain the best possible results. From the more expensive to the least expensive strategies, these include development of rail systems, development of busways and high occupancy vehicle lanes, prioritization for public transport vehicles on city streets, more frequent services, lower fares in high demand areas, pulse point (timed transfer) systems in low density areas, incorporation of minibus services, and demand management (such as telecommuting, the four day work week, the nine day fortnight and flexible working hours).

To achieve the public purpose, public transport must obtain the most in ridership in return for the limited financial resources available to it. This requires a preference for:

-Lower, rather than higher capital projects

-Comprehensive regional projects rather than projects limited to single corridors

-A logical progression from lower capacity programs to higher capacity programs. For example, new bus services should be provided with minibuses with larger buses used only when passenger demand requires it.

-Strategies responsive to the needs of customers. These should emulate the advantages of the automobile by increasing service frequencies, geographical coverage and travel time.

-Application of competitive incentives to factor costs so that the higher levels of service promised can be delivered, rather than being consumed as monopoly rents (premiums) by public transport operators.

A few successful applications warrant mention:

-In Los Angeles, a 40 percent ridership increase occurred when passenger fares were reduced by 40 percent (1982 to 1985). This is a larger ridership increase than is projected for the new rail routes being developed. Unfortunately, the inability to control cost increases in the public monopoly environment required fare increases that have driven away most of the new passengers.

-A 40 percent increase in ridership resulted from a 60 percent increase in public transport bus service in Fort Wayne, Indiana (1985 to 1988). The service expansion was made possible by the use of cost effective private contractors.

-Commercial minibus operators have increased public transport ridership on major travel corridors in Miami with only one-third of the riders being diverted from subsidized public bus services. New customers have been attracted by much more frequent service.

-In Edmonton, Alberta, public transport use in the suburbs was increased by redesigning bus services as "timed transfer" systems. With buses converging periodically at a single point, waiting times are reduced for passengers who travel, protection from weather can be cost effectively provided, and convenient mobility is provided throughout a low density community.

SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS NOT YET IDENTIFIED

Because of the ongoing debates about high capital rapid transport systems in this part of the world, and because US urban rail developments have been characterized as success stories by some, it is appropriate to describe the recent US experience in development of new rail systems.

The development of new urban rail systems in the US is not a response to the demand for urban travel, it is primarily a response to the availability of large amounts of federal funding for such purposes. This point was underscored by the US Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) in assessing a light rail proposal in a medium sized US urban area:

"Light rail would do little to reduce traffic congestion or air pollutant emissions. ... notwithstanding our cost-effectiveness and financial concerns, UMTA agreed to advance the ... light rail proposal into the preliminary engineering phase of project management. UMTA's decision was a reflection of congressional funding earmarks of more than $15 million for engineering and right of way acquisition."

A US Department of Transportation study by Don Pickrell documented the tendency of US rail project developers to over-project ridership (average more than 70 percent), underestimate construction costs (average nearly 50 percent) and underestimate operating costs (average nearly 80 percent). According to this report, the annual cost per new public transport rider is more than $25,000 for the new Atlanta underground system. Public transport's market share declined in all US urban areas building or expanding urban rail systems in the 1980 to 1989 period, and in all but one urban area with urban rail (Boston). US urban areas, including those with rail are becoming more, not less dependent upon automobiles.

An example frequently cited by rail advocates is Portland, Oregon, which built a light rail line for $400 million. When the number of new riders (riders diverted from automobiles) is considered in context of urban travel in the Portland area, less than 0.2 percent of travel was diverted to the light rail line ---an amount equal to less than 60 days of natural growth in travel in the Portland area.

On average, approximately one-third of passengers on the new rail systems were former automobile users. But even that number over-estimates the impact of the new rail systems with research indicating that most people who substitute rail use for automobile use are automobile riders, not drivers. Most of the automobiles stay on the road, while automobile passengers move to subsidized transport from unsubsidized transport ---an undesirable public policy outcome.

Finally, with what is known about the cost performance of monopolies, especially public monopolies, urban rail has a particular disadvantage. Without strategies to apply competitive incentives to the factor costs of urban rail, its operating cost disadvantages are likely to worsen as time goes on.

In the context of the entire urban form, new rail systems in North America have provided only a marginal mobility return for a king's ransom. It is fair to suggest that in the US, urban rail has reduced automobile use only in planners' models. There is no question but that the same amount of money could have produced better results through a mix of less expensive and more comprehensive strategies.

The North American experience suggests that busways and high occupancy vehicle lanes may be a more cost effective strategy, where there is substantial passenger demand.

-A Los Angeles busway carries more riders than any new light rail line in the United States. A Washington busway carries more riders than any underground route into the city, and more than double that of any new light rail line in the nation. These busways permit travel by car pools and van pools, yet continue to operate at free flow. Use by car pools and van pools is important, since most urban employment destinations in the US cannot be cost effectively served by bus or rail services.

-The Lincoln Tunnel busway in New York, which operates only in peak direction, carries more riders than any rail line from the New Jersey suburbs.

-The Ottawa busway carries 200,000 daily passengers, which is one-third the number of people carried on Washington's underground. The Ottawa system, which consists of only two routes compared to Washington's seven, was built for 1/20th the cost and serves an area with one-fifth the population. (The Ottawa busway does not enter the commercial core, where busway vehicles operate in dedicated lanes on city streets).

It is not suggested that urban rail systems should not be built, or that busways are preferable to urban rail systems (even busways can be expensive compared to other strategies). Rather, it is suggested that public transport strategies must be tailored to the particular urban form ---that because resources are scarce, strategies must obtain the greatest public benefit for every dollar expended. Practical and rational solutions are required. President Reagan noted that when he arrived in Washington he was confronted by a number of "solutions for which problems have not yet been found." New urban rail projects in the US can be characterized as such a solution. They haven't reduced traffic congestion, air pollution or energy consumption.

For urban rail to achieve the claims of its proponents, urban densities must be much higher than they are now in New Zealand, Australia, the United States and Canada. Rail cannot create the higher densities. The higher densities will be required beforeurban rail can reduce automobile congestion, air pollution or energy consumption. The urban rail debate is fundamentally not a debate about public transport modes, it is rather a debate about urban densities. Candor would require advocates of urban rail for urban areas as different as Hong Kong is from Christchurch and Canberra to seek the public policies necessary to multiply urban densities, and only then to turn their attention to building the high cost, high capacity systems so out of place in today's ever more sparse urban form.

The revolution in life styles and living patterns pre-requisite to transforming an automobile orientation into rail orientation is not seriously on the public policy agenda in New Zealand or any other affluent nation. It is doubtful that New Zealanders will rush to move from single family houses to high rise apartment blocks.

PUBLIC TRANSPORT AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE

The theory holds that public transport can reduce traffic congestion, air pollution and energy consumption. The reality is that traffic congestion, air pollution and energy consumption have increased, just as before subsidies.

No affluent nation has converted from lower density urban development to higher. Even in western European nations with higher public transport market shares, densities are declining and the environment is becoming more hostile for public transport. Moreover, public transport will have a more difficult time obtaining public funding than in the past.

This challenging environment calls for effective leadership by public transport officials. To maintain credibility, theory must be brought into conformance with reality. Promises should be made only if there is a reasonable expectation of fulfillment. Public transport strategies should be selected based upon the most cost effective use of public transport's limited resources. And most importantly, public transport officials must resolutely pursue the public purpose, rejecting any diversion by conflicting objectives.